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ENFORCING THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE
OF FORCE: THE U.N.'s RESPONSE TO
IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT*
Mary Ellen O'Connell**
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and swiftly occupied its neigh-
bor, Kuwait.' Within hours, the United Nations Security Council
("Council") condemned the invasion, demanding immediate and
unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. 2 During the Cold War, the United
Nations (U.N.) rarely responded to aggression with anything more
than such resolutions of condemnation.3 Either the Soviet Union or
the United States regularly vetoed proposals to do more. The end of
the Cold War has freed the U.N. to enforce the U.N. Charter's
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** Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University - Bloomington. I would like to
thank Kellye Y. Testy (..D. '91), MaryAnn Ruegger (..D. '91) and John D. Bessler (S.D.
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1. Apple, Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges
United Actions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
2. U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 660, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990)
[hereinafter S/RES/660] states:
The Security Council,
Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of
Iraq,
Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces
to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990;
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for
the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and
especially those of the League of Arab States;
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure
compliance with the present resolution.
3. Cassese writes, "[t]he mechanism set up in San Francisco could have worked if the
cold war had not broken out at once and the world had not split into two blocks." A.
CASsESE, VIOLENCE iN Th MODERN AGE 33 (1986). Dinstein states, "It]he record of the
Security Council is replete with cases in which it has been deadlocked, due to political
cleavages splitting the five Permanent Members. When a breach of (or a threat to) the
peace directly affects one or more of the big Powers, or even their 'client States', the veto
power can be counted on to ensure that only an anodyne resolution will be adopted." Y.
DINsTEmN, WAR, AorRassioN, AND SELF-DEFENSE 268-69 (1988).
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prohibition on the use of force.4 After August 2, it began enforcing
the prohibition against Iraq.5
When the drafters of the Charter outlawed the use of force,
they understood the need for an enforcement mechanism. Most
international law is enforced by self-help.6 But a small state invaded
by a larger one would have difficulty enforcing its rights under the
4. The prohibition on the use of force refers to the U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), which states
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The prohibition is now also a part of
customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97-103 (Merits). The phrases "law of war" or "law of armed
conflict" are sometimes used to mean the prohibition on force, but they are broader phrases
that could also mean humanitarian law. The confusion stems from the translation of two
Latin phrases, "jus ad bellum" and "jus in bello." In English both are rendered "law of
war." To make clear that this article concerns the first phrase, the words "prohibition on the
use of force" will be used.
The term "war" was an issue in the Gulf conflict. The United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall have the Power ... To declare War ... ." Thus, Congressmen and
others want to know if the fighting in the Middle East was a "war." When the Constitution
was written, a formal declaration of war was important in international law. It is no longer.
Today, the laws of war - humanitarian and Charter-based - go into effect when fighting
breaks out. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
August 12, 1949 reprinted in Docum'mErs ON ra LAWS OF Wa (A. Roberts & R. Guelff eds.
1982). Article 2 says that the "Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed.conflict which may arise .... ." See also Schachter, The Right of States to Use
Force, 82 MicH. L. Rav. 1620, 1624 (1984). Thus, the term "war," as a term of art, may be
important in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, but for purposes of this article, as with
international law generally, "war" means armed conflict of any type. See Franck, Declare
War? Congress Can't, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at A19, col. 2.
5. The Security Council first imposed a comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq and
Kuwait. U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 661 reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990). It then
gave permission for states to use force if necessary to enforce the embargo. U.N. Security
Council Resolution No. 665 reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329 (1990) [hereinafter S/RES/665]. It
further prohibited aircraft from bringing prohibited cargo to Iraq. U.N. Security Council
Resolution No. 670 reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1334 (1990). Finally in Resolution 678, the Security
Council authorized the use of force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq
one final opportunity, as a pause of good will, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1
above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
the resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in
pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution ....
U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 678 reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990) [hereinafter S/
RES/678].
6. See, e.g., A. D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 21-25 (1987).
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Charter. The Charter, therefore, gives the Security Council authority
to deal with threats to the peace and acts of aggression.7 When
necessary, the Council may use troops of the member nations to
counter aggression."
Because of the Cold War, the Security Council has never used
this mechanism. In the Korean conflict, the Council managed to call
on members to send troops voluntarily, but only because the Soviet
Union was boycotting the Council when theresolution was adopted. 9
In contrast, with regard to Iraq, the Council has had the cooperation
of all the permanent members. 10 Yet, the Council still has not called
on members to send troops under the U.N. flag, which is regrettable,
for purposes of achieving respect for the prohibition on force.'
2
Nevertheless, the coordinated response to Iraq demonstrates the
U.N.'s ability to respond to unlawful force.
But will the U.N.'s response convince critics that law is relevant
to war? Since the adoption of the Charter, some political scientists
have argued that state sovereignty does not admit the possibility that
states would restrain their use of armed force. Morgenthau, Kennan,
Hoffmann and others have belittled the attempt to achieve peace
through law.'3 They conclude that governments will not refrain from
using force when their states' vital interests are at stake merely
because of a rule, especially when no sovereign exists to sanction
7. U.N. CEARTEr art. 39 states: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommen-
dations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security."
8. U.N. C ARTER art. 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
9. For a complete account of the U.N.'s actions regarding Korea, see L. GOODRICH,
KOREA, A STuoy oF U.S. PoLICY IN TH UNrrED NAnoNs (1956).
10. With regard to Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force to liberate Kuwait, all
permanent members voted in favor except China, which abstained. The other members voted
8 to 2 in favor. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 6. Abstention does not defeat a
resolution. See, e.g., Gross, Voting in the Security Council, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 315 (1968).
11. Resolution 678 only cites Chapter VII of the Charter which contains articles 39-54. S/
RES/678, supra note 5.
12. See infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text. The Charter provisions authorizing force
speak in terms of U.N. action, not authorizing force by an independent group of states. See
also, Urquart, Learning From the Gulf, Naw YORK REVIEW oF BooKs 34 (March 7, 1991).
13. S. Horrm-NN, International Law and the Control of Force in THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (Hoffmann & Deutsch ed. 1968); H. MORGENT=AU, PoLImCs AMONG
NATIONS 281 (5th eds. 1978); G. KIENNAN, AMERICAN DipLOMACY 1900-1950 95 (1950).
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rule violations.14 A variation on this theme holds that the international
system is too chaotic and violent for legal rules to work.'5 Again,
however, the chaos is due to competing sovereigns who are subject
to no superior authority. According to this view, governments see
no reason to concede their important national interests to another
state when the government has an army available to protect those
national interests. 16 As empirical proof of their position, political
scientists invariably offer the record of conflict since the Charter's
adoption. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is only the latest example.
Admittedly, the list of conflicts is long, but looking at the wars
fought in recent years suggests international law has had some
success. To the extent war persists, the problem seems to lie in the
weakness of the enforcement system, not in law's irrelevance.
In response to Iraq, the weakness in enforcement has been over-
come, and the U.N. has acted dramatically.'7 It has adopted sweeping,
comprehensive enforcement measures- culminating in Desert Storm.'8
Desert Storm seems to be what conventional thinking in international
law has wanted in terms of enforcement: force authorized by the
United Nations to counter aggression.' 9 Desert Storm is the answer to
critics of the law. Nevertheless, international lawyers should now
question whether it is the- sort of enforcement the nations of the world
really want.2° In light of the Gulf War, U.N. members need to consider
how best to meet aggression in the post-Cold War era: what should
"a new world order" under the "rule of law" mean?21
14. D. ZIEGLER, WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL PouTcs 167-69 (1977).
15. S. Ho .ArN, supra note 13, at 25. "It is once again the uniqueness of the international
milieu and the seriousness of the problem of violence that oblige one to take a dim view of
the role of law in ordering such a group."
16. Id. at 33.
17. See supra note 5.
18. Desert Storm is the code name given to the coalition forces fighting to oust Iraq from
Kuwait. Rosenthal, War in the Gulf, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
19. See G. CRK & L. Som, WoRa PEACE THROUGH WoRLD LAW xvi (1966).
20. Before any hint of the war in the Gulf, Professor Louis Henkin had already questioned
whether the Charter's collective security system would be the right one for the post-Cold War
era: "From several perspectives, the machinery for maintaining international peace and security
which may have seemed appropriate then [in 19451 may not seem appropriate now." Henkin,
International Law, Politics, Values, and Functions, General Course on Public International
Law, 216 Recueil des Cours 144 (1989-IV).
21. In his address to the United States at the outset of Desert Storm, President Bush said:
This is an historic moment. We have in the past year made great progress in
ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to
forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where
the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.
When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at this new world
[Vol. 15
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This article considers, first, whether it is relevant to discuss a
law prohibiting' force. Can law actually restrain war? It concludes
that law has restrained the use of force and that with better enforce-
ment of the law, we can expect even more restraint. The article then
considers how the prohibition on force applies to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, and to the response to the invasion. Finally the article offers
suggestions for improving enforcement of the prohibition on force
in light of Desert Storm.
I. VERIFYING THE RELEVANCE OF THE
PROHIBITION ON FORCE
In 1945, members of the United Nations prohibited by law the
use of force in international relations. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.
This prohibition, the culmination of efforts over a hundred years,
22
has changed how governments use force. No longer is force consid-
ered an unfettered prerogative of states. Powerful states do not use
it with impunity against weaker ones. When governments use force
today, officials consistently provide a'legal argument for using it and
invariably add that it was used as a last resort2
3
Despite the evidence that Article 2(4) has had an impact on how
nations behave, many lay people and apparently most political scien-
tists do not accept that law can restrain force. The political scientists
argue that the anarchical nature of the state system prevents states
from abandoning the use of force.24 Governments may sign solemn
pledges against war, but, the argument goes, such pledges are not
worth the paper on which they are written. While it is clear that
order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to
fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders. We have no argument with
the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their
safety.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A14, col. 1.
22. For a history of the attempt to outlaw war, see L. HENmN, R. PUGH, 0. ScHAcHMR
& H. SMT, InTERNATiONAL LAW 668-77 (2d ed. 1987).
23. Schachter, supra note 4, at 1623.
24. But see Bull, The Continuing Validity of the Rule of Nonintervention in THE ANAR-
CHICAL SocIETY 184 (H. Bull ed. 1984).
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force persists and that international law can go further to restrain
the use of force, it is -not true that law has not and cannot have an
impact.
A. The Historic Relevance of Law to War
For two hundred years international law did not contain rules
against using force. Quite the contrary, under international law states
could use force to protect their legal rights.2 War was the system's
enforcement mechanism.2 Moreover, the ability to wage war was
considered an essential attribute of statehood. The state sought
exclusive control over the use of force and resisted inroads on this
exclusive right.
Nevertheless, states never considered law irrelevant to force.
From the beginning of the interstate system, international law rules
flourished to control how war was fought. 27 Grotius wrote on both
the law of war and the law of peace.8 By the law of war he meant
rules on conducting war, including how to declare war, declare
neutrality, and respect belligerency. 29 These rules had a very old
pedigree, dating from the middle ages and the time of chivalry. They
were observed in part because they had reciprocal benefits. Any state
that wanted to enjoy them had to respect them.30
After the United States Civil War, however, some world leaders
realized that with advances in technology the only way to humanize
war was to outlaw it.3' During the Hague Peace Conferences at the
end of the 19th century, attempts were made to find alternatives to
war for the settlement of disputes and the enforcement of rights, 32
such as a permanent court of arbitration. The First World War
25. According to Dinstein, "the freedom to wage war was countenanced without reservation
[in the 19th and early 20th centuries] . . . ." Y. DmisTmN, supra note 3, at 166.
26. Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem
of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1956).
27. Moreover, the laws of war were the first to be systematically codified in international
law. THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNiucrs ch. V (Schindler & Toman ed. 1981).
28. GROTIUS, DE lURE BELU AC PACIS (1624); ENCYCLOPAEDIC DCTIoNARY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 150 (1986); NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATioNs 102-14 (rev. ed.
1954).
29. See supra note 4.
30. See, e.g., Tam LAws OF Aiumm CoNucrs, supra note 27.
31. "Efforts to outlaw war intensified as war became more terrible and more expensive of
human resources .... ." Henkin, supra note 20, at 144. Schindler and Toman also suggest
that the call for more humane warfare was a result of civilization advancing. Tan LAws OF
ARMED Cor-ucTs, supra note 27, at ch. V.
32. Y. DNsrEN, supra note 3, at 76.
[Vol. 15
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further spurred the movement for peace. With the founding of the
League of Nations and the adoption ,of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty,
states took the first important steps toward outlawing war.3" But had
the underlying problem been addressed? How could law restrain war
if the use of force lay at the heart of state sovereignty: would states
really participate in the process of undermining one of the attributes
that made them states?
After the Second World War, they did. As discussed at the
outset of this section, the United Nations Charter prohibits the use
of force by states.14 This is the law President Bush has referred to
in condemning the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.35 It is the legal basis
of the numerous resolutions by the United Nations against Iraq and
other aggressors.16 The International Court of Justice pronounced in
a decision in 1986 that a rule against the use of force not only exists
in the Charter but is now part of customary international law. 37 In
the same case, the United States argued that the prohibition on the
use of force is a rule of jus cogens - a peremptory norm of
international law.
38
B. The Political Science Critique of Law and War
While the terror of modern war makes these legal developments
understandable, they conflict with much theory about international
33. Henkin, supra note 20, at 144.
34. The prohibition is found in Article 2(4), supra note 4. See also the Definition of
Aggression which is an elaboration of the U.N. Charter prohibition on the use of force. The
Definition states in Article 3: "Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war,
shall ... qualify as an act of aggression: (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of
a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary,
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory
of another State or part thereof ..... " U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
35. "People aren't doing this for the United States, they're doing it for world order and
international law ..... " Dowd, Argentina Hailed by Visiting Bush, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1990,
at A15, col. 6; "The question here is international law and respect for one's neighbors."
Schmitt, U.S. Views Threat by Iraq As Strategy to Split Critics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1990,
at A12, col. 1; "Saddam Hussein has been so resistant to complying with international law
that I don't yet see fruitful negotiations." Rosenthal, Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
36. See supra note 5.
37. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 103 (Merits).
38. Id. at 101. States may not opt out of or derogate from a rule of jus cogens, even
though the states of the system make the rules and the making of new rules can usually only
begin with the derogation from existing rules. See I. SiNc.AM, Tim VrmENA CoNVEtrrsoN ON
THE.LAW OF TREAirms 203-07 (2d ed. 1984).
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relations. The state system has no sovereign; the units compete, and
they use violence regularly. In such conditions, some question, how
any international law can exist, let alone restrain force.
3 9
Most political scientists recognize the existence of international
lawA0 Most would agree that Austin's definition of law as "an evil
annexed to a command" does not adequately characterize law, while
H.L.A. Hart's broader concept of.law, as the consensus rules of a
community, does. Hart explicitly includes international law within
the category of law.41 Moreover, Louis Henkin's authoritative work,
How Nations Behave, makes the case that states routinely comply
with international law, and international law helps create a relatively
orderly international community. 42
But many who accept the existence of general international law
reject the ability of law to restrain war.43 Stanley Hoffmann argues
39. John Austin is invariably cited by those who hold the view that international law is
not law: "Every sanction properly so called is an eventual evil annexed to a command ....
And hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is not positive law:
for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection
to its author." J. Ausn N, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DET RmvED 133, 201 (1954)
(emphasis in original).
40. Indeed, Roger Fisher implies that some who do not believe any international law exists
draw this general conclusion from examples based on violations of the prohibition on force.
"Conflict and violence often obscure both the fact that international law is a significant factor
in today's world and that there is a vast amount of routine compliance with it." R. FIsHER,
IMPROvING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1981); see also L. HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAvE (1979); H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 13, at 281.
41. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 222-25 (1961). Obviously this debate is
treated in the most cursory fashion here. See, e.g., T. FRANCic, THE POwER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONo NATIONS (1990); cf. Tes6n, International Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical
Consent, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 84 (1990).
42. "The deficiencies of international law and the respects in which it differs from domestic
law do not justify the conclusion that international law is not law, that it is voluntary, that
its observance is 'only policy'. They may be relevant in judging claims for the law's success
in achieving an orderly society. In many domestic societies, too, the influence of law is not
always, everywhere, and in all respects certain and predominant; the special qualities of
international society, different perhaps only in degree, may be especially conducive to disorder.
Violations of international law, though infrequent, may have significance beyond their numbers:
international society is a society of states, and states have power to commit violations that
can be seriously disruptive; also the fact that the units of international society are few may
increase the relative significance of each violation. Still, violations of international law are not
common enough to destroy the sense of law, of obligation to comply, of the right to ask for
compliance and to react to violation .... Over-all, nations maintain their multivaried relations
with rare interruptions." L. HENC~iN, supra, note 40, at 97-98; see also Franck, Legitimacy in
the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988) ("[M]ost states observe systematic
rules much of the time in their relations with other states.").
43. Hoffmann believes that international law exists, despite regular violations, because for
all law there is a tension between observation and non-observation. Only unnecessary rules
The Law of War
that states cannot observe the prohibition on force due to the inherent
nature of the state system."4
In the case of international law, however, the nature of the group
- i.e., a fragmented, competitive coexistence of rival societies -
is such that the resort to violence is of the essence of the group:
violence is the outcome of its structure; and the tensions between
actual or desired behavior and the legal system tend to destroy or
to cripple the latter.
45
The structure lacks a single sovereign. It has instead over 160
sovereigns, all with armies competing for national interests. In this
chaotic situation states have not developed a restraint system that
could get state compliance. According to Hoffmann, law in general
has three types of restraint, all of which are weak in the international
system: 1) obedience owing to expectations of benefits or detriments;
2) obedience to rules owing to a sense of duty; and 3) obedience
after coercion."
Yet the system cannot be to weak, because, as noted above,
most of international law is obeyed most of the time.47 The wide-
spread compliance international law enjoys can be attributed, for the
most part, to Hoffman's "expectations of benefits or detriments."48
States also obey some international law out of a sense of duty.49
Admittedly, coercion plays a less significant role than the other two
forms of restraints, though it remains a factor.
5 0
Even without coercion, however, states generally observe the
prohibition on force, along with the rest of international law. Costs,
benefits and duty can and do restrain the use of force. Admittedly,
coercion might do a better job, and the lack of a coercive restraint
may explain why the use of force persists. But the fact that inter-
national law needs better enforcement does not prove it cannot
restrain force. It can and has.
are uniformly observed. S. HopFpFiw, supra note 13, at 21-22. In fact despite Hoffmann's
implication, most of international law is observed most of the time. L. HENMN, supra note
40, at 47.
44. S. Ho ' AN, supra note 13, at 22.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Id. at 25.
47. L. HENKIN, supra note 40; R. FIsHER, supra note 40, Franck supra note 42; Brownlie,
The Reality and Efficacy of International Law, 52 BpaT. Y.B. INr'L L. 1, 2-3 (1981).
48. See R. FISHER supra note 40; A. D'AmATo, supra note 6.
49. Franck, supra note 42.
50. Hoffmann suggests that coercion is weak because international law lacks a central
authority. S. HOF .ANN, supra note 13, at 32-36. He does not think such an authority can
be achieved.
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C. The Evidence of Law's Restraint on Force
We can find evidence that law has restrained force by comparing
the state of affairs before the adoption of the Charter with the
situation today. Most uses of force today conform with the Charter.
Law will not restrain all uses of force, nor is it the only means of
restraint. Nevertheless, the rules explain much of the change.
5 1
Many types of armed conflict lawful 100 years ago have disap-
peared from the arsenal of states since the adoption of prohibitions
on the use of force. As Cassese points out, states generally restrict
their use of armed force to intervention in civil war and to security
issues. In relatively few instances, for example, have states sought to
take control of territory through armed force: China in Tibet, Iraq
in Iran, Arab states in Israel, Argentina in the Falklands, Indonesia
in East Timor, India in Goa, Pakistan in Kashmir, and Iraq in
Kuwait.5 2 Half of these attempts have failed.
53
Moreover, States rarely use force when issues other than security
are at stake. States no longer use force to collect debts, for example.
They do not use it to respond to insults, not involving force,54 or to
treaty violations. By contrast, the Soviet Union used force in Af-
ghanistan because it feared the influence of an Islamic state on its
borders. 55 The United States used force in Grenada and Nicaragua
to stop communism.
Arguably, states have abandoned the casual use of force out
of a sense of duty, 56 Hoffmann's second restraint.57 Nuclear de-
51. One would hope that leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union have not risked
direct confrontation during the Cold War in part because of the risk of using nuclear weapons.
L. HENtiN, S. HoFbmAN, J. KIRKPATRICK, A. GERSON, W. RooEas. & D. SCHEFFER, RiaGHT
v. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FoRcE 80-81 (1987) [hereinafter L. HENUN
& S. HomLAN].
52. In December 1990, Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put the number
of armed conflicts since the adoption of the U.N. Charter at one hundred-twenty.
53. Interestingly, in all these cases the attacking state had some colorable legal claim to
the territory in question. No cases since the U.N. Charter exist of a state attempting to annex
territory by force to which it had no claim, even though as late as the 1940's this was obviously
an activity which states thought they could engage in with impunity.
54. Some might characterize the U.S. bombing of Libya after terrorist attacks accomplished
with Libyan support to be an armed response to insults. See Greenwood, International Law
and the United States Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 933 (1987).
55. See, e.g., H. BRADSHER, AFGHANISTAN AND TEm SOVIET UNION (1985).
56. Professor Henkin concludes that states are deterred from using force by the adoption
of a legal norm:
Despite common misimpressions, Article 2(4) has indeed been a norm of behavior
and has deterred violations. In inter-state as in individual penology, deterrence often
cannot be measured or even proved, but students of politics agree that traditional
[Vol. 15
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terrence, for example, does not explain the change in behavior
because large nations could accomplish their goals with conven-
tional weapons.
Besides the restraint of duty, states also face a cost for using
force unlawfully. States most commonly enforce international law by
conferring benefits and detriments, 8 Hoffmann's first restraint. 9
Hoffmann believes states have difficulty seeing the long term interest
in obeying international law. 60 Yet, in almost all cases of unlawful
use of force, states have imposed costs on the wrongdoer, even if
only condemnation in the United Nations. 61 States generally face
some cost for disobedience.
Though duty, costs, and benefits can and do enforce the prohi-
bition on force, the law is not uniformly enforced. Ironically, however,
much of the violence cited by international law's critics is lawful.
Hoffmann admits that the Charter rules themselves actually permit
much contemporary armed conflict.62 In particular, the Charter does
not prohibit civil war or aid to governments fighting civil wars.6 Most
major fighting occurring today, including the fighting in Ethiopia,
Angola, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Liberia, El Salvador and Mozambique
are all civil wars. Only the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia do not qualify as civil wars.
war between nations has become less frequent and less likely. The sense that war is
not done has taken hold, and nations more readily find that their interests do not
in fact require the use of force after all. Expectations of international violence no
longer underlie every political calculation of every nation, and war plans lie buried
deep in national files. Even where force is used the fact that it is unlawful cannot
be left out of account and limits the scope, the weapons, the duration, the purposes
for which force is used.
Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 Am. J. INrr'L
L. 544 (1971).
57. S. HoF~mANN, supra note 46.
58. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 6.
59. S. Ho- mA , supra note 46.
60. Id.
61. This has been true even regarding powerful states, presumably with a certain amount
of influence. The General Assembly voted 75 to 20 to condemn the United States invasion of
Panama. G.A. Res. 44/240 (29 Dec. 1989). It voted 111-9 to condemn the invasion of Grenada.
U.N. Doe. A138/PV.43 (1983), at 45; see also Schachter, supra note 4, at 1623. In some cases
there have been higher costs. The United States levied sanctions against the Soviet Union for
the invasion of Afghanistan and against Argentina for the invasion of the Falklands. The
United States levied sanctions against India for fighting Pakistan.
62. S. HoFF ANN, supra note 13, at 30.
63. But see Doswald-Beck, The Legality of Military Intervention By Invitation of the
Government, 56 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 251 (1985) (arguing that aid to even the government in
a civil war is a violation of the right to self-determination).
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Cassese, writing four or five years ago, made the same obser-
vation. 64 He showed that states using armed force either claim to do
so in self-defense or at the invitation of a legitimate government .65
Both types of claims, if supported by the facts, would be lawful uses
of force. Cassese wants, therefore, to reform the rules by narrowing
the exceptions. 6 But Hoffmann asks, "why bother?" Governments
would only ignore the revised rules. Hoffmann's conclusion, however,
does not take into account that he, Cassese, and others agree that
states have shifted their behavior to avoid violating the rules. Indeed,
he believes, paradoxically, that states would resist any call to revise
the rules, because "even though, in a crisis, legal restraints prove to
be fragile indeed, the statesmen do not enjoy being pushed to the
point where they may have to demonstrate this fragility." 67 In other
words, governments do not "enjoy" violating the law.
They do not "enjoy" violating the prohibition on force. They
observe it enough to support the conclusion that such a prohibition
exists. Yet it is violated enough without adverse response to conclude
that it is not well enforced. Neither duty, condemnation, nor benefits
kept the United States out of Vietnam, Grenada or Panama, the
Soviet Union out of Afghanistan or Czechoslovakia, or Vietnam out
of Cambodia. The rules are often ignored and the enforcement system
is inadequate. It lacks coercive enforcement.
D. The Need for Coercive, Institutional Enforcement
Improving enforcement must take into account the difference
between the rules against force and other international rules. As
argued above, states today use force in response to serious issues.
That means the cost of deterring them from using force in those
instances will be high, higher than in other areas of the law.
Even small states can enforce their legal rights in areas other
than the use of force because the rights are reciprocal or the costs
involved are within their resources. One of the world's smallest states,
Nauru, objected to United States tuna fishers operating within its
economic zone. It arrested tuna fishers who did so until negotiations
took place. Due to the low level of this issue, the United States did
not use force against Nauru.68
64. A. CASSESE, supra note 3, at 35-39.
65. Id; see also Schachter, supra note 4, at 1623.
66. A. CAssrm, supra note 3, at 39-45.
67. S. HoFFMANN, supra note 13, at 41.
68. L. HaEnx, R. PuoH, 0. SCmAcHTnR & H. Sr, supra note 22, at 1317. The United
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But these remedies are less useful to the smaller state attacked
by one its own size or larger. Building on the examples of Italy's
invasion of Ethiopia, Germany's invasion of Poland, and Japan's
invasion of Manchuria, the drafters of the Charter believed weaker
states would need the help of the international community to oppose
violations of the Charter's prohibition on force. 69 Coordinated sanc-
tions and, in some instances, coordinated force, would even the
balance. More importantly, the potential to use force would deter
aggressors.
70
The U.N. has attempted to implement the Charter scheme on a
few occasions. It ordered some sanctions against South Africa and
Rhodesia for violations of international law where the victims could
not successfully oppose the violations. In the case of South Africa,
sanctions probably helped to emphasize the moral bankruptcy of
apartheid. The sanctions ordered against Iraq were much more im-
pressive, and, if given 'time, might have been highly effective. 71 In
Korea, and now in the Middle East, the U.N. has authorized the use
of force.
In neither case of authorized force, however, did the Security
Council follow the Charter. The Charter calls for the U.N. itself,
not a small group of members, to do the countering. Article 45
requires:
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military
measures, Members72 shall hold immediately available national air-
States breached a boundary agreement with Mexico over an area called El Chamizal. Mexico
refused tio negotiate about other matters until the dispute was resolved. The United States
owes Nicaragua reparations for U.S. support of the contras. With some determination,
Nicaragua can get some of this money. O'Connell, The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary
Judgments of the International Court of Justice: A Study of Nicaragua's Judgment Against
the United States, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 891 (1990). Reciprocal rights and self-help offer all
states the means to enforce a wide range of their rights,, regardless of the size of the state
involved. See O.Y. EIAOAB, TE LEG Azrr oF NoN-FoRcmra COUNTER-MEA S INR INrER-
NATIONAL LAW (1988); E. ZoLLER, PEACETIME UNmAraEA REaMDms: AN ANALYSIS OF CoUN-
TERmEASUims (1984).
69. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAmBRO & A. SIMoNs, CHARTER OF THE UNTrrm NAToiqs 290-
353 (1969).
70. Id. at 317. In the case of large states attacking large states, the U.N. could help, but
a large state would probably have the resources to defend itself.
71. See Malloy, The Iraqi Sanctions: Something Old, Something New, 15 S. ILL. U.L.J.
413 (1991); see also Hufbauer & Elliott, Sanctions Will Bite - and Soon, N.Y. Times, Jan.
14, 1991, at A15, col. 1.
72. Presumably all members of the United Nations are required to send troops, even
Germany and Japan. See U.N. CHART= art. 48. But apparently most German international
lawyers argue that Germany is not so obliged. See, e.g., Klein, Rechtsprobleme einer deutschen
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force contingents for combined international enforcement actions.
The strength and degrees of readiness of these contingents and plans
for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid
down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article
43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee.
73
The U.N. has never negotiated agreements with members, nor has it
made contingency plans. It has never, therefore, realized the deter-
rence value of such a force, let alone the coercive restraint it might
provide. 74
The Charter first prohibited the use of force fifty years ago.
That prohibition has changed how states use force, despite the
skepticism of political scientists. But force has not been eliminated.
Indeed, it remains frequent. The U.N.'s enforcement mechanism has
not functioned as planned, though it has finally come close to doing
so in the Middle East.
II. THE RULES APPLICABLE TO IRAQ'S
INVASION OF KUWAIT
Iraq violated the prohibition on the use of force by invading
Kuwait. Despite arguments which Iraq or others might raise, the
prohibition is good law and applies to this situation. Moreover, Iraq
has no defenses which could justify the invasion. The U.N., therefore,
had the right to respond to Iraq, even to the point of authorizing.
force. The U.S. and its coalition partners needed U.N. authorization
before they could launch Desert Storm. The authorization they
Beteiigung an der Aufstellung von Streitkriften der Vereinten Nationen, 34 Za6RV 444-51
(1974).
73. U.N. CHAaRm art. 45; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text. U.N. CHARTER
art. 43 states:
(1) All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security.
(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces,
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided.
(3) The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
74. See infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
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received permitted only the liberation of Kuwait, not the eradication
of Iraq or its leader.
A. Iraq's Violation of Article 2(4)
1. Is 2(4) Good Law?
This article argues that Iraq violated Article 2(4) by invading
Kuwait - but is Article 2(4) good law? It has not been well enforced.
States make the riles in international law; if they, regularly ignore a
rule, it may lapse. 75 Over twenty years ago, Thomas Franck wrote
that Article 2(4) was dead. 76 He pointed out that with the frequent
violations of 2(4) it no longer counted as good law. 77 He supported
his argument, however, by showing that the type of wars being
fought since the Charter do not fit within the prohibition intended
in 2(4).78 He does not show therefore that 2(4), as written, is being
ignored. His argument stands only for the proposition that 2(4) is
not as important as its drafters might have thought. He does not
show that it is today a useless rule. In response to Franck, Louis
Henkin pointed out that 2(4) has not made war obsolete but rather
has made obsolete "the notion that nations are as free to indulge in
it as ever, and the death of that notion is accepted in the Charter." 79
If, as Franck suggests, nuclear weapons account for some of the
restraint on the use of force, "Article 2(4) would not be the less a
norm: law often reflects dispositions to behavior as much as it shapes
them." 0
75. It is well accepted that an international customary rule can change when states begin
a contrary practice combined with opinio juris. A new treaty may also change a rule of
custom. The question "Is Article 2(4) good law?" implies that an old treaty rule could be
changed by a new custom. See RESTATEmENT (THIIW) oF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UmrrED STATES § 102 reporter's note 4 (1987).
76. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
77. Franck notes:
But if the rules prohibiting recourse to force were imperfect and, to some extent,
already obsolescent by the time the Charter came into operation, this does not alone
account for the demise of Article 2(4). Blame for this must be shared by powerful,
and even some not-so-powerful, states which, from time to time over the past twenty-
five years, have succumbed to the temptation to settle a score, to end a dispute or
to pursue their national interest through the use of force.
Id.
78. Cf. 'A. CAssEsE, supra note 3.
79. Henkin, supra note 57, at 545.
80. Id.
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Moreover, no state has disclaimed Article 2(4). 8 0 On the contrary,
the members of the U.N. have reconfirmed it with the adoption of
the Definition of Aggression in 1974.82 In addition, states regularly
invoke Article 2(4) in condemnation of states that have violated it.
In 1986, the International Court of Justice had the task of deter-
mining the status of Article 2(4). It concluded that because no state
has denounced it and, because it is regularly invoked, it is good
law.8 3 Even in the Nicaragua case, where it was accused of violating
the rule, the United States never tried to argue that it was not good
law. For that matter, neither has Iraq, though basically it claims
Article 2(4) does not apply to its invasion of Kuwait.
2. Does Article 2(4) Apply to the Invasion of Kuwait?
Article 2(4) has rather precise terms. It prohibits the use of force
against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." These terms have suggested to some international
lawyers over the years that its scope is narrow.Y The better view is
to treat Article 2(4) as a broad prohibition on the use of force.
Under almost any interpretation, however, Iraq has violated its terms.
For example, Iraq claims Kuwait is part of its territory."5 Thus,
Iraq might argue its invasion could not be in violation of a prohibition
on the use of force against the territorial integrity of another state.
8 6
81. Y. DiNsmEN, supra note 3, at 93-94; Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on
the Use of Force, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 113 (1986).
82. See supra note 34.
83. It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules
in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained,
with complete consistency, from the use of force.... The Court does not consider
that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be
in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of
customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in
general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not
as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie
incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to
exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the
State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude
is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, supra note 37, at 98.
84. Schachter, supra note 4, at 1624-27.
85. Sciolino, Unto Itself; Iraq Yearns for Greatness, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, § 4, p.1,
col I; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1990, at DI, col. 6.
86. See Schachter, supra note 4, at 1627-28. Schachter points out that this argument has
been implied in other territorial disputes.
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Iraq does not appear to have a good claim to the territory of Kuwait.17
Even if it did, states are not permitted to use force to recover claimed
territory.88 States must use peaceful means to resolve such questions.8 9
Peaceful means are available and work well. Numerous countries
since the end of colonialism have gone to the International Court of
Justice, to name but one forum, to resolve disputes just like the one
between Iraq and Kuwait. Libya and Chad, Burkina-Faso and Mali,
Cambodia and Thailand are all examples. 90
Article 2(4) also prohibits states from using force against the
territorial integrity and political independence of other states. Thus,
2(4) only protects states. If it could be shown that Kuwait is not a
state, 2(4) would arguably not apply to the case of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait.
It is true that Kuwait is small, that its government is not
representative and that it obviously does not have the military ca-
pability to defend itself from aggressive states. These are not the
criteria, however, under which international law determines state-
hood. Traditionally, international lawyers established statehood by
citing certain indicia of statehood such as the existence of a govern-
ment, territory, boundaries, population, and the ability to enter into
international relations. 91 Today these indicia are n6t regarded so
formalistically but rather are considered in a broader context. For
the most part, states reach a consensus on whether an entity is
sufficiently like a state to be considered one. Membership in the
United Nations is therefore an important indicator. Only states may
be members and since most states in the world are members, when
they vote on accepting a new entity, they are giving their collective
87. IRAQ-KuwArr n; BoRDEt AND TERmomAL DISPUTES (A. Day ed. 1982). Applying the
principle of prescription, Kuwait has been in control of territory since the turn of the century
- enough time to defeat Iraq's adverse claim. See R. JENmros, THE ACQUISITION oF TERmTORY
In INTEmATONAL LAW (1963).
88. Y. DiNsmN, supra note 3, at 87.
89. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
adopted by U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 24, 1970, U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
90. These examples concern land boundaries. States regularly resort to the ICJ for maritime
boundary decisions as well, including: U.S. and Canada, Germany, Denmark and Holland,
Norway and Denmark, Libya and Tunisia, Malta and Libya, and El Salvador and Honduras.
91. See, e.g., Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (26 Dec. 1933)
reprinted in VI INTEmATIONAL LEoISLAT ON 620 (M. Hudson 1932-34); see also I. BROWNLIE,
Psmcn,'nus oF PtmuLic INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-79 (4th ed. 1990).
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opinion that the entity is a state. 92 Kuwait is a member of the United
Nations. 93
Kuwait does not, however, have a representative government. 94
With the demand for democracy in so many countries today, inter-
national lawyers have begun to discuss whether democracy is not
now a criterion in international law for a legitimate government, and
whether without a legitimate government an entity may not be a
state.95 The existing criterion is only that the government be in
effective control.9 Even so, at times the international community has
agreed that certain governments, such as the government of Rhodesia
under Ian Smith, while in effective control were still illegal. 97 As a
result, Rhodesia was not treated as a state. The current move to
make democracy a criterion of legitimate government is similar to
past debates over what makes a government legitimate. The inter-
national community may decide that states with non-representative
governments are not to be treated as states. But any such development
is a long way into the future. As of today, only a minority of states
have representative governments. It would be impossible for them to
deny statehood to the others, including Kuwait.
The above discussion all relates, however, to a Kuwait before
the invasion of Iraq. After the successful invasion, was Kuwait any
longer a state? Iraq's attack violated international law. Under inter-
national law Iraq could not benefit from its violation (ex injuria jus
non oritur). In particular, the Definition of Aggression says that
states cannot acquire territory by aggression.98 For purposes of in-
ternational law, therefore, Kuwait's statehood continued.
92. See Conditions for Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1947-
48 I.C.J. 63.
93. Kuwait is also a member of the Arab League but this may not be as good an indicator
since the Arab League also admits Palestine which does not have a government or boundaries
or, more importantly, has never existed without a foreign occupying army. Palestine is not a
member of the United Nations.
94. Although Time Magazine describes the government as "quasi democratic .... " having
voluntarily created an oligarchy of competing interests, Kuwait, in effect, was ruled by popular
consent. The contract among the families was the seed of a quasi-democratic tradition that
has persisted for nearly three centuries. Taif, Toward a New Kuwait, Tam, Dec. 24, 1990, at
26.
95. See Declaration of Copenhagen 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990).
96. See, e.g., Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 503 (1990)
(recent reiteration of the effective control principle).
97. Resolution Concerning Southern Rhodesia, S/RES/217, 20 SCOR, Resolutions and
Decisions, at 8 (Nov. 20, 1965).
98. Definition of Agression, supra note 34, at art. 5(3) ("No territorial acquisition or
special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful"); see also
Schachter, supra note 4, at 1636.
[Vol. 15
The Law of War
Moreover, Kuwait's statehood would have continued even if the
occupation had lasted many years. Israel occupied the Gaza and the
West Bank of the Jordan in defensive actions after aggression by
surrounding Arab states. 99 Although it was not the aggressor, most
international lawyers conclude that Israel may not annex those
territories, even now, after some twenty years.10t United Nations
members do not believe the legal status of the territories has changed.
If Israel had been the aggressor, the argument against annexation
would be even stronger. Kuwait remained, therefore, even while
occupied, to be a separate state, and would have for a very long
time.
3. Are There Defenses for Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
International lawyers categorize aggression as an international
crime. 10 1 As with domestic crimes, there are defenses to international
crimes, even for the use of force. But the primary defense is narrow
and does not exonerate Iraq. Article 51 of the Charter permits states
to use force in self defense, if an armed attack occurs.lea Kuwait had
not attacked Iraq and so on its face Article 51 does not provide a
defense for Iraq's actions.
a. Economic Necessity
According to news reports, Iraq invaded Kuwait to resolve
economic difficulties. 0 3 Iraq owes Kuwait a considerable amount of
99. A. GERSoN, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATioNAL LAW (1978).
100. An Israeli writer, Yoram Dinstein, speculates that
if the de facto control of the territory annexed by the aggressor continues uninterrupted
for generations, the non-prescription rule may have to give way in the end. International
law must not be divorced from reality. When a post-debellatio' annexation is solidly
entrenched over many decades, there may be no escape from the conclusion that
new rights (valid-de jure) have crystallized, although they flow from a violation of
international law in the remote past.
Y. DiNsTEN, supra note 3, at 161. But cf. Gerson, supra note 99.
101. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Y.B.
INT'L CoMM'N 59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1988.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 5-1 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
103. "Seeking to explain Iraq's rationale for invading and occupying Kuwait, [Foreign
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money and apparently cannot pay. Iraq also wanted to seize shared
oil fields because it believed Kuwait was cheating on a sharing
agreement. Iraq also has a long-standing desire to get better access
to the Persian Gulf by controlling Kuwait's Bubiyan Island. °4
None of these economic or legal grievances satisfies the require-
ments of Article 51105 No matter how threatened a state may be by
economic difficulties, it is not justified in using armed force. The
International Court of Justice has recently reiterated that Article 51
permits force only "if an armed attack occurs. ' 1' 6
b. Invitation
Iraq argued that a group of Kuwaitis seeking to overthrow the
government of Kuwait invited it to invade.I °7 In making this argu-
ment, Iraq borrowed from the Soviet Union and the United States.
Both countries have justified recent interventions on the basis of
dubious invitations. 08 Externally-created invitations, however, do not
Minister] Aziz told reporters that Iraq's action was defensive in nature because it felt threatened
by 'economic war' from Kuwaiti policies that were driving down oil prices and bankrupting
Iraq." Drozdiak, Baker, Aziz Describe Six Hours of Talking Past Each Other, Wash. Post,
Jan. 10, 1991, at A23, col. 2.
104. Kifner, Iraq Proposes Peace Talks, Then Lashes Out at the U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug.
22, 1990, at A9, col. 4; Ibrahim, Iraq Seeks Bigger Role in OPEC, N.Y. Times, June 28,
1990, at DI, col. 6.
105. The Definition of Aggression does not mention economic pressure as amounting to
aggression. The 1952 Report on the Question of Defining Aggression suggests that "unilateral
action to deprive a State of the economic resources derived from the fair practice of
international trade, or to endanger its basic economy" might be a form of aggression. U.N.
Doc. A/2211, at 58 quoted in L. HENKiN, R. PuGS, 0. SCHACITR & H. Swrr, supra note
22, at 688. But no form of economic aggression was included in the final document. See also
Schachter, supra note 4, at 1624.
106. Military and Paramilitary Activities,'supra note 37, at 103.
In the case of individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State
concerned having been the victim of an armed attack .... There appears now to
be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting
armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack
must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across
an international border, but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries .... '
Even providing military supplies to insurgents does not justify using force in the territory
of the supplying state, let alone causing economic pressure. Id. Although the Court said it
was not addressing the "issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed
attack." Id.; see also Y. DnsTN, supra note 3, at 1,73.
107. Kifner, Iraq Proposes Peace Talks, Then Lashes Out at the U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug.
22, 1990, at A9, col. 4.
108. During the Afghan conflict, the Soviets intervened at the Afghan government's invi-
tation, but to get the invitation, the Soviets had first to. collude with pro-Soviet Afghanis to
have Afghanistan's president killed. See The Russians Reach the Khyber Pass at Last, THE
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justify forceful intervention. Moreover, the Soviets and Americans
at least argued they had invitations from the governments in au-
thority. International law has never authorized assistance to those
seeking to topple a government, except perhaps in the colonial
context.1 9° At a minimum, the invitation must be issued by a gov-
ernment.
But even that minimum may not be enough. Louise Doswald-
Beck has collected the state practice through 1985 on the right of
states to intervene by invitation in civil war. She demonstrates that
in most cases, the community of states criticizes intervenors regardless
of their invitation. Her conclusions coincide with the principle of
self-determination. If peoples do not have the vote, armed struggle
is often the only alternative means of changing a government. Outside
powers intervening to. keep a government in power may deny the
wishes of the majority. In most cases, intervention also heightens the
conflict.
Despite the logic of this argument against intervention, the
Reagan administration argued that international law should permit
intervention to install democratic regimes. In other words, the outside
power should be able to change the government if it does not
represent the people. This view basically fits Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. According to Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Alan Gerson,
[t]he Reagan Doctrine, as we understand it, is above all concerned
with the moral legitimacy of U.S. support - including military
support for insurgencies under certain circumstances: where there
are indigenous opponents to a government that is maintained by
force, rather than popular consent; where such a government depends
on arms supplied by the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, or other
EcoNoMtsT, Jan. 5, 1980, at 25. The United States intervened in Grenada arguing the island's
Governor General invited it to invade. International lawyers have questioned whether the
Governor General had the authority to invite the U.S. in, but even if he did, the invitation
was apparently issued after the United States began the invasion. Ta EcoNomsT, Mar. 10,
1984, at 31. The United States also claimed to have an invitation to intervene in Panama, but
as discussed above, for purposes of international law, governments must be in effective control
to be considered a government, at least at some point. Governments in exile do have legitimacy,
like Kuwait's, if they have been deposed by aggression. The Endara government never had
control of Panama. Farer, supra note 96.
The French often respond to invitations from their former colonies to intervene but at least
they usually do so in response to a government in control through its own efforts. Indeed,
the French are scrupulous on this point. During the recent conflict in Chad, the French
changed sides in the middle of the battle for the capital when they perceived the insurgents
had gained the upper hand.
109. Doswald-Beck, supra note 63.
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foreign sources; and where the people are denied a choice regarding
their affiliations and future."10
Kirkpatrick and Gerson say the Reagan doctrine was never
actually invoked by the United States as the justification for U.S.
intervention during the Reagan years. Moreover, the doctrine appears
to have no support from other states. Thus, it has not even begun
to develop into a rule of customary international law."'
Nevertheless, some international lawyers argue that the Bush
administration acted under a version of the Reagan Doctrine When
the United States used force in Panama in December 1989.112 The
Bush administration did not cite the doctrine. Rather, it argued
that it could lawfully invade under a combination of three other
arguments: that it had received an invitation to invade from the
legitimate government of Panama, that it was rescuing U.S. nation-
als, and, that it was protecting the Panama Canal as permitted in
the Canal Treaties." 3 Neither the law nor the facts support the
Administration's combination argument, however. 14 Thus, Anthony
D'Amato, among others, argues that the U.S. should have relied
on the argument that it had the right to intervene to install a
democratic regime,"15 a version of the Reagan doctrine. In fact,
most states criticized the U.S. action and do not support a modi-
fication of the rules to accommodate what the United States did in
Panama.
116
A variation on the Reagan doctrine holds that states should be
able to intervene to stop massive violations of human rights."
7
Proponents of this argument cite the Tanzania invasion of Uganda,"1
8
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Indian invasion of
West Pakistan." 9 In fact, however, neither Vietnam nor Tanzania
110. L. HENxI & S. HoFXmANN, supra note 51, at 20.
111. Id. at 42-43.
.112. D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 516 (1990).
113. Sofaer, 1990 PROC. OF AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
114. The best of the arguments is that U.S. nationals were in danger. Many international
lawyers support the right of states to rescue their nationals. See, e.g. L. HENmr & S.
HOFFmANN, supra note 51, at 41-42. The problem with this justification is that the operation
was far out of proportion to what was needed for a rescue.
115. D'Amato, supra note 112.
116. G.A. Res. 44/240, supra note 61.
117. See F. TES6N, Hu mArEL INTERVENTION: AN INQuIRY INTO LAw AND MORA=r'
(1987).
118. Id.
119. R. Lu.IcH, HUMA rrA Au INTERVENTION: A REPLY TO IAN BROWNiE AND A PLEA FOR
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justified their invasions as humanitarian. As with the argument
favoring force to install democracy, this one also contains a con-
tradiction. Killing people to enforce human rights obviously harms
the human rights of the deceased. Iraq committed far more serious
human rights abuses than Kuwait's traditional rulers.
Iraq could not justify its invasion by citing the cause of de-
mocracy, human rights, invitation by insurgents, or economic self-
defense. The only justification for the use of force is self-defense
in response to an armed attack. Iraq suffered no such attack.
B. The Response to Iraq
Iraq cannot invoke Article 51 in its defense but Kuwait can.
This section reviews the terms of Article 51 and what they mean
for Kuwait and other states, in particular the United States, joining
with Kuwait against Iraq.
1. The Scope of Article 51
The United States almost immediately flew troops to Saudi
Arabia at the request of the Saudi government in case Iraq decided
to continue its invasion beyond Kuwait. 120 Kuwait also asked for
United States assistance in countering the Iraqi invasion.12, Govern-
ments may ask for help when responding to an armed attack from
an outside power (as opposed to help in civil war). Article 51 says
in pertinent part, "[n]othing in the Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self defense." Collective self-defense
means a third state may join the victim state to counter an armed
attack. '2
Kuwait was unable, on its own, to counter Iraqi force in any
meaningful way. It may appear, therefore, that once Iraq occupied
Kuwait, the chance to defend had ended. A use of force months
after Iraq's occupation by states joining with Kuwait may seem to
be "a first use of force".12 3 This view, however, would doom small
CoNsmucTwv ALTEmATrvES m LAw AND Crvu WAR n THE MoDmuR WoRD, 229-33, 235-
51 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
120. Kifner, Iraq Proposes Peace Talks, Then Lashes Out at the U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug.
22, 1990, at A9, col. 4.
121. Apple, Bush said to Approve Plan to Activate Some Reserves, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1990, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at All, col. 1.
122. Schachter, supra note 4, at 1638-41.
123. This view was expressed to the author by a reporter. Telephone interview with The
Philadelphia Inquirer (Jan. 19, 1991).
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states to the aggression of larger ones because in many cases small
states would need time to mount a counterattack. Even Great Britain
needed several weeks to organize a counterattack when Argentina
invaded the Falkland Islands. The United Nations did not suggest
that the delay precluded Britain's right to respond in self-defense.
At some point the right to defend might end. 1m No actual rule
exists saying when that time might be, but the United Nations has
provided something of a precedent in the current crisis. It authorized
the use of force after January 15, 1991 - five-and-a-half months
following the invasion. 25 Thus, six months would not appear to be
too long a time to wait under these facts.
During the wars of national liberation, some writers described
colonialism as a state of permanent aggression justifying the use of
armed force in defense of such aggression. 26 It is difficult to find
support from the state system for this view, but in the case of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the concept is useful. Until the interna-
tional community decided that Kuwait no longer exists, Iraq in a
sense committed on-going aggression.
2. Security Council Pre-emption of Self-defense
The Security Council was active in opposing the Iraqi invasion
from the first. It adopted numerous resolutions condemning the
invasion and calling on members to take measures to oppose Iraq. 2
7
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter says states may act in self defense
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in
the exercise of this right of self defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in anyway affect
the authority and the responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Article 51 makes clear that the Security Council has primary au-
thority for repelling an armed attack. During the Cold War, how-
124. As Dinstein suggests regarding occupied territory, legal rights can grow out of an
illegality. Moreover, under doctrines of laches and acquiescence, an aggressor could argue in
some circumstances that the time to defend had passed. Y. DrNs-EiN, supra note 3.
125. S/RES/678, supra note 5.
126. Y. DiNsTmN, supra note 3, at 88 (citing Gorelick, Wars of National Liberation: Jus
Ad Bellum, 11 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 71, 77 (1979)).
127. See supra note 5.
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ever, the Council did not take "measures necessary to maintain"
the peace and so states were free to conduct their defense as they
saw fit.
In this case, because the Security Council took a number of
measures to ensure the peace, the question arose whether the United
States or even Kuwait was free to act without Security Council
authorization. The United States argued that it need not get the
Council's authorization, 28 but gave no explanation for ignoring the
plain meaning of Article 51. Neverthelessthe United States sought
and the Security Council granted permission to use force. The
Administration acted contrary to its stated legal position because it
wanted to maintain multilateral support. It is for this very reason,
however, that the Administration's interpretation of Article 51 is
incorrect. The Charter drafters 'knew it would take multilateral
action to successfully oppose aggression in many cases. The Security
Council has the responsibility to coordinate those efforts. If some
states act unilaterlly, including the defended state, the Council's
efforts could be undermined.
129
Dinstein's analysis, pre-dating the Middle East crisis, supports
the pre-emption theory:
Self defence exercised by States (legal entities) is not to be equated
with self-defence carried out by physical persons .... It is not
128. Lewis, U.S. Preparing U.N. Draft On Claims Against Baghdad, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1990, at A12, col. 1. Michael Reisman would agree, arguing that states always have the right
of self defense, whether the Council orders other action or not. This is his interpretation of
the word "inherent" in Article 2(4). M. Reisman, Remarks at the U.S.-Soviet Conference on
International Law and the Non-Use of Force, Carnegie International Center, Washington,
D.C. (Oct. 4-6, 1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Soviet Conference]. Dinstein, however, believes the
term "inherent" in Article 51 is not so important. He agrees with the International Court of
Justice that it means the right is customary, not that it is irrevocable. Y. DiNsTMN, supra note
3, at 169-71. Moreover, Reisman does not adequately explain the meaning of the phrase "until
the security council acts" if states need not follow the Council's lead when acting in self
defense.
129. Article 51 could permit the Security Council to require Kuwait and even its freedom
fighters still in Kuwait to follow the Security Council's lead. Richard Gardner believes such a
notion is absurd. U.S.-Soviet Conference, supra note 128. But when the United Nations took
over command of operations in Korea, General MacArthur had supreme command of U.N.
forces. If he had wanted irregulars to cease fighting to suit the U.N.'s strategic or tactical
purposes, such a command would hardly have seemed absurd to him. See, e.g., M. HARRmsON,
FinEs ARouND TBE HORIZON 49 (1989) ("[t]he United States provided the manpower, the
weapons, the money, and the strategy'); see also L. GooDRIcH, supra note 9 ("The Command
of the United States forces was so organized as to assure to the United States Government
complete operational control of the armed forces of other Members in Korea."). Forces must
fight in a coordinated fashion, under one authority - the Security Council or those authorized
by it.
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beyond the realm of the plausible that a day may come when
States will agree to dispense completely with the use of force in
self-defence, exclusively relying thenceforth on some central
authority wielding an effective international police force. 130
Moreover, members of the Security Council made it clear to the
United States that they thought the Council had to authorize force
before it could be used.' Thus, the best view today is that the
Security Council can pre-empt a state's right to self-defense. That
is also the best policy for enforcing the prohibition on the use of
force. The Council is more likely to authorize force consistently
with the letter and spirit of the Charter than would states acting
unilaterally and should therefore have superior rights.
3 2
What if the Council had vetoed rather than approving the
United States request for authorization to use force? A veto com-
plicates matters because it is not the same as an explicit decision
by the Council that its measures, short of force, were proving
adequate. The Council has vetoed numerous requests for action
when threats to and breaches of the peace have occurred. In those
cases, a veto has left the requesting state free to act. The same
must be true even after the Council has authorized systematic
measures against an aggressor. One states's veto of a request to use
force should not be interpreted as a decision by the Council that
force is not necessary. The only way for the Council to convey
such a decision is, by a Council resolution, adopted by a majority
vote with no veto by a permanent member, forbidding force and
stating positively that its measures were sufficient to maintain peace
without force.
Abe Chayes would agree that the U.S. had to seek authorization
before using force against Iraq but he also expressed the view that
the U.S. could not have used force if China or another permanent
member vetoed resolution 678.11 This does not seem consistent,
however, with the Council's practice, as explained above. Oscar
Shachter also expressed the view that the U.S. needed to seek
authorization but he added that it could veto a resolution opposing
force and thus be free to act. 34 This may be true but it does not
130. Y. DNsrm, supra note 3 at 171.
131. Friedman, Allies Tell Baker Use of Force Needs U.N. Backing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,
1990, at A14, col. 1.
132. See infra notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
133. U.S.-Soviet Conference, supra note 128.
134. Id.
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explain how the U.S. would go forward were its request for au-
thorization vetoed by another permanent member. The suggestion
here offers the way forward - when authorization is vetoed,
another resolution must follow stating the Council believes its
measures, short of force, are adequate. If the U.S. vetoes that
resolution, it could proceed to use force, though it would face
justifiable criticism if it were in the minority.
3. Limits on Authorized Force
The Security Council authorized the use of "all necessary means
to uphold and implement" the Council's resolutions on Kuwait. 135
Did this language permit any and all use of force? Was the force
limited to liberating Kuwait? What would such a limit mean during
hostilities?
The Charter permits the Council to authorize force only after
other measures have proved or will prove inadequate:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations. 3
6
Many experts thought the embargo of Iraq had not proved inade-
quate. 137 Nevertheless, the Security Council was required to draw
such a conclusion before it could authorize the use of force. 38 The
Council authorized force only to liberate Kuwait. The words of the
resolution limited action to enforcing prior resolutions, in particular,
135. S/RES/678, supra note 6.
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decision, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
137. See, e.g., Hufbauer & Elliott, Sanctions Will Bite and Soon, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1991 at A15, col. 1.
138. Some doubt remains on this question. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
Force must have been authorized under article 42 and not simply collective self-defense because
presumably the United States would not need permission for collective self-defense.
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the one calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 139 The coalition
used massive force directly against Iraq to accomplish this goal.
Some reports suggested that the coalition was aimed at crippling
Iraq's military capacity, which would have gone beyond the coali-
tion's authorization. 140 It appears, however, that Desert Storm con-
formed with the Council's resolutions.
In addition to Resolution 678, the doctrine of proportionality
is a general limit in international law,' 41 and would apply to the
force used in liberating Kuwait. Invading and occupying Iraq would
not be proportional to the liberation of Kuwait. Proportionality
means putting a stop to the provocation, not taking revenge. Israel
was criticized, for example, for invading Lebanon in 1982 after
armed provocation. 42 The critics said Israel should have stopped at
the source of the attacks - southern Lebanon. Instead, it attacked
the Lebanese capital.
43
Korea may provide the closest analogy. The Security Council
resolutions on Korea called for withdrawal of North Korean troops
north of the 38th parallel. 44 The Unified Command under the
United States went to the General Assembly for permission to go
beyond the 38th parallel. The Assembly gave this permission. Res-
olution 678 on Kuwait authorized force to counter the aggression
against Kuwait. This did not mean that no military action could be
carried out in Iraq. Saddam Hussein was simply not to be a target,
unless the Council gave further authorization. The Second World
139. S/RES/660, supra note 2. In resolution 675, the Council authorized force to enforce
sanctions against Iraq. The Jordanians complained that their trucks in Iraq were bombed, but
675 authorized such bombing and indeed authorized force against Jordan itself, within the
limits of proportionality, for undermining measures necessary to maintain the peace. See U.N.
CATm tm art. 39.
140. According to President Bush: "We're not in the business of targeting Saddam Hussein."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1991, at A15, col. 1. But cf.
Editorial, 'All the Way' in the Gulf?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1991, at A28, col. I ("We will
stay the course, and we will succeed - all the way."); Friedman, Pax Americana; What the
United States has Taken on in the Gulf, Besides a War, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1991, at § 4,
p. 1, col. 1 ("The goal is to render Iraq unable to project power beyond its borders for years
to come.").
141. Schachter, supra note 4, at 1637-38.
142. Id.
143. Israel, in responding to armed attacks or threatened attacks in 1967 and 1973, occupied
territory in Egypt, Jordan and Syria. It argued that it needed to hold these territories as a
defensive buffer for itself. The United Nations has called on Israel to return the zones in
exchange for promises by its neighbors to respect Israel's borders. Thus the U.N. action does
not necessarily clarify whether the U.N. thought Israel was justified in taking the territories.
144. M. HAumREsoN, supra note 129, at 47.
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War may be a contrary example. At the end of the war, the Allies
dismantled the governments of Germany and Japan, trying the
remaining Axis leaders for international crimes. Saddam Hussein
has committed crimes and he, too, could be tried were he to be
captured. 145 But the question is whether an effort to capture him
and to dismantle his government was authorized. It was not. The
U.N. did not exist to limit the Allies' actions after World War II.
Thus, that example is unpersuasive.'"
III. IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PROHIBITION ON FORCE
Desert Storm enforced the U.N.'s prohibition against the use
of force. It is a rare example of lawful, coercive enforcement against
aggression and was certainly an improvement over unilateral, unau-
thorized uses of force. Nevertheless, there is a better means of
enforcing the prohibition on the use of force. The U.N. Charter
provides for the formation of U.N. forces to counter aggression.
These forces, not non-U.N. forces, should respond to violations of
the prohibition on the use of force. The reason for the preference
is clear: The existence of U.N. forces, ready to respond to any
aggression at any time, will act as a deterrent to future aggression
in a way that Desert Storm will not.
Desert Storm is less likely to deter because deterrence depends
on the credibility of the enforcement mechanism, in other words, the
likelihood that it will be used in a consistent, fair manner. 47 It is
unlikely that Desert Storm will be reformulated, especially if impor-
tant United States interests are not involved. On the other hand,
having U.N. forces in place, prepared to respond consistently to
violations, according to Charter rules, could entail a credible deter-
rent. Deterring force and eliminating the need for enforcement would
clearly be the best goal of an enforcement system.
Critics might argue, however, that the likelihood of forming a
U.N. force is even less than the chance of reformulating Desert
145. The state of Iraq, too, could be held responsible. And indeed, probably will be because
the Council resolutions say it owes reparations. Nevertheless, in a non-representative regime,
the people should not have to pay punitive, as opposed to compensatory, damages. Their
responsibility for the actions of a dictator is diminished.
146. Even if Hussein should not be a target of the coalition, he could be tried for his
crimes. The Iraqi people themselves could turn him over to the U.N. for justice.
147. R. FIsHER, supra note 40, at 41. Professor Franck makes the same point using somewhat
different terms: "The inconsistent application of a rule or general principle undermines its
capacity to elicit compliance." T. FRANcK, supra note 41 at 138.
1991]
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
Storm. That may be, but if it is ever to happen, now is the best
moment since the founding of the U.N. to do so. Foregoing this
opportunity also means foregoing the chance to get the best compli-
ance possible with the prohibition on the use of force.
President Bush has at least indicated that the United States might
now be ready to participate in the reform of the U.N. Upon launching
the ground war against Iraq he promised a credible U.N., one that
fulfilled its founders' vision.
When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at
this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations
can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of
the U.N.'s founders.' 48
To fulfill the vision, at least three things must happen in the use of
force area: a U.N. force must be created; it must be available against
all aggressors, including permanent members of the Security Council;
and it must only be used as a last resort.1
4 9
A. A United Nations Army
The Charter calls for all members to contribute troops to the
U.N. to be ready to counter aggression at the command of the
Security Council, under the U.N. flag. 150 The preparation of such a
force will provide a credible deterrent and will conform more closely
with notions of fairness and morality. Such conformity will in turn
enhance the deterrence value of the force.
The current enforcement mechanism in international law is self-
help. Sometimes states use it; sometimes they do not. This inconsis-
tency makes self-help a less than credible deterrent. Desert Storm is
similar. It is an American idea, one that could not have been predicted
a month before Iraq's invasion. 51 If the U.N. prepares a force, the
likelihood that it will be used as intended is higher than the likelihood
148. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A14, col. 1.
149. This section presents suggestions for improving enforcement. The suggestions focus
only on improving law enforcement. Other things could be done to improve the prohibition
on force. For example, the U.N. could improve the rules, civil war could be addressed, and
so on. But those issues are beyond the scope of this paper, as is the general topic of
enforcement.
150. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, supra note 73. Professor Schachter suggested in a telephone
interview that states will not contribute forces. If so, they are conceding that the U.S. will
continue to play the major role. Cf. Urquart, supra note 12.
151. Editorial, How To Let Arab States Work It Out With Iraq, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,
1990, at A22, col. 4.
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that some state, somewhere in the world, will respond to a use of
force, especially where it has no national interest involved. The
drafters of the Charter believed that the very existence of a ready
force would deter.' 5 2 Moreover, the force would be credible because
it would have the means to respond. African organizations have tried
to intervene in several African conflicts, but, with limited resources,
they have had little success. 53 The U.N., however, can call on the
whole world and thus organize a force which should discourage
would-be aggressors. 54
Also, the more fair and the more morally acceptable a deterrent,
the more credible it is. Enforcement by U.N. troops is fairer because
it is universal, not unilateral. It is universal in two senses - the
troops making up the force will be international and the decision-
making is international. 55 Thus, U.N. decision-making avoids cre-
ating the sense, existing in the Gulf today, that a few countries
fought their enemies instead of enforcing international law.'
56
The existence of a U.N. force should undermine the excuses
used by states, particularly the United States, to use force unilaterally.
The world community could decide as a whole, through the U.N.,-
whether force should be used against aggression or in other situations,
such as to install democratic regimes, to stop genocide, or to aid a
government battling insurgents.
57
Multilateral decisions to use force would diminish manipulations
of the rules and the facts. Objective decision-making and concentra-
tion of the means of enforcement in the international organization
152. The knowledge that the Council had armed forces at its disposal and the expectation
that they would be used, if necessary, was intended to make it easier for the Council
to handle conflicts without having to resort to armed force. Thus, the inability to
apply Article 42 has weakened the essential foundation of the whole United Nations
system for maintaining peace and security, including its provisions for the pacific
settlement of disputes.
L. GOODRICH, E. MBRo & A. SimoNs, supra note 69, at 317.
153. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1982, at A21, col. 3.
154. Planning and resources could be shifted, from NATO and the Warsaw Pact to the
U.N.
155. Both Fitzmaurice and Fisher have pointed out the benefit of multilateral versus unilateral
enforcement. Unilateral enforcement gives the impression of a political contest between two
states, rather than an enforcement situation by a disinterested party. See Fitzrnaurice, The
Future of Public International Law in Livre du Centenaire, Annaire de l'Institut de Droit
International (1973).
156. See Bali, The Gulf Crisis, NEw YoRu Rvmrmw oF Boors 8 (Dec. 6, 1990).
157. Article 39 permits the Security Council to respond to threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace, 'and acts of aggression. These are broader circumstances than self-defense and would
arguably include situations of genocide, and so on.
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are essential components of a credible, persuasive enforcement sys-
tem.
B. Uniform Application of the Law
To enhance the sense of fairness and multilateralism, the Security
Council should implement Article 27(3). 15 It requires that states party
to the conflict, including permanent members of the Security Council,
abstain from voting in the Security Council. In practice the permanent
members regularly veto resolutions in which they are implicated.
59
Obviously, the permanent members should not be voting on resolu-
tions determining whether they have committed aggression. The law
against war should apply to the permanent members, too, and should
not be subject to the veto.
The very definition of justice subsumes the notion that "arbitrary
distinctions" are eliminated.?6 An aggressor's military or economic
power is an arbitrary distinction in determining whether the prohi-
bition on force has been violated. Many will argue that the permanent
members will not accept this limit on their power. That may be, but
both the Americans and the Soviets are recommitted to the U.N.161
If that commitment means anything, it should mean the Charter
applies to the permanent members, along with all others.
C. Force as a Last Resort
Of course, even if the veto were suppressed, it may not be
practical to use force against the permanent members. But other
measures, such as economic sanctions or denial of privileges, could
be used against permanent members. Permanent members might leave
the organization if they faced sanctions. But the U.N. has applied
158. U.N. CARTER art. 27(3) states:
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52,
a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
159. See Y. DiNsmnEI, supra note 3. This is an example of a treaty provision made obsolete
by a contrary customary practice.
160. John Rawls defines justice as "the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the
establishment, within the structure of a practice, of a proper balance of competing claims."
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, PHiL. Rv. 165 (1958).
161. See supra note 140 (President Bush's Speech); Mikhail Gorbachev, "U.S.S.R. Arms
Reduction: Rivalry into Sensible Competition," Speech delivered before the United Nations
on December 7, 1988;.reprinted in & translated in 55 VITr. SPEECHES OF THE DAY 234 (Feb.
1, 1989).
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sanctions against numerous states and they do not seem to leave -
even Iraq is still a member. Why would a permanent member be
different?1
The Security Council should only use force, in any case, if it
determines that other measures will not work. Perhaps the most
serious question about Desert Storm is whether the Security Council
really believed no measure short of force would work. 63 For a
deterrent to be credible it should also conform with some interna-
tional sense of morality.'" The Catholic Bishops' contemporary
statement of the just war doctrine suggests all measures short of war
should be tried. 65 This criterion also conforms with the requirements
of Article 41, and, so, if implemented would enhance the credibility
of the deterrent. Many experts thought the embargo against Iraq
would have worked if given more time, or if more forceful measures
had been used to enforce it.16 Perhaps not, but in future cases, the
Council must assure itself that it authorizes force only as a last
resort. Additionally, the Council should make an explicit finding of
that fact.
International law's system of horizontal, self-help enforcement
which works for so many rules does not work as well where the cost
of deterring powerful, militaristic states such as Iraq is high. The
drafters of the Charter who outlawed force knew that multilateral
efforts provided the answer. We may finally now have a chance to
put their theory to work. If so, the U.N. needs to fully implement
the Charter scheme. The U.N. as a whole should organize to counter
aggression. It should apply the law to all members and it should
exhaust measures short of force before using U.N. troops.
IV. CONCLUSION
Thousands died following Iraq's unlawful invasion of Kuwait
on August 2, 1990. The fact that international law prohibits such
invasions did not stop Iraq or the bloodshed. Nevertheless, interna-
tional law has had an impact on how states use force. States do not
use force casually today, and outright "grabs" for territory, like
162. If a permanent member left, would it lose its veto should it attempt to return? If the
answer is yes, this loss alone might deter defections.
163. Urquart, supra note 12 at 35.
164. R. FisHER, supra note 40.
165. THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC
CONFERENCE (1983).
166. See supra note 137.
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Iraq's in Kuwait, are unusual. Nevertheless, when states have used
force unlawfully, the U.N. has done little in response during the last
forty years of the Cold War.
With the end of the Cold War, we have the best opportunity to
improve enforcement since the Charter's adoption. In the first major
test of the prohibition on force since the end of the Cold War, the
international community joined together to confront Iraq's aggres-
sion. This action is itself an important validation of the prohibition
on force. But the goal now should be to institutionalize, along just
and credible lines, the coordinated response to force. The best way
to do so is through the United Nations. One state, especially one
like the United States with its recent history of violating the prohi-
bition on force, cannot achieve the same positive ends the United
Nations can. The members of the U.N. need to prepare a U.N. force
ready to counter aggression. Such a force, together with multilateral
decision-making applied consistently and uniformly to all members
of the U.N., will achieve maximum deterrence of the use of force.
These reforms would be a fitting tribute to all who have died in the
Gulf War..
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